IP Intel — x402 IP Intelligence

Extract up to ten URLs in one paid call.

Reads the public x402 Bazaar catalogue and finds offers comparable to yours, either from a resource_url whose 402 challenge is fetched without paying, or from a category and description you supply. Every comparable offer is listed with its price, its provider host, a similarity score and the terms both sides share, so comparability is justified rather than asserted; the formula, its weights and the inclusion threshold are stated in the answer. Prices are aggregated as median, p25 and p75 over comparable offers denominated in a known stablecoin, and position says whether your price sits below, at or above that range against stated thresholds. Below five comparable offers no position is given at all and the caveat says why. Offers denominated in other assets are counted but kept out of the price distribution, because converting them would require a price feed this service does not consult. The catalogue sample, its size against the full catalogue and its fetch time are named in every ans

Fetch one URL and return clean article Markdown without navigation, ads or cookie banners.

A stateful duplicate check for agents that settle x402 payments. Supply any of payment_id, payload_hash and nonce; each is hashed with SHA-256 before storage, so the service keeps fingerprints and timestamps and never the values themselves, never a payload, never an address. The answer states for every supplied identifier whether it was seen before, when it was first and last seen, how often, and whether the first sighting falls inside window_seconds. The recommendation is ablehnen only for a repeated payment_id or nonce inside the window, since both are unique by definition; a repeated payload_hash alone yields pruefen, because buying the same query twice is legitimate. Every threshold behind the recommendation is stated in the answer. Fingerprints expire 24 hours after the last sighting. Set record to false to ask without writing, so a repeated check does not create the duplicate it reports. This endpoint does not verify payments, does not look at any chain and does not block anythin

Inspect one IP address for network ownership, location and abuse signals.

Inspect up to 200 IP addresses at 0.0005 USDC per address.

Return title, description, OpenGraph card, canonical URL, feeds, favicon and detected technologies for one URL.

Fetches the 402 challenge of a foreign endpoint without paying anything — no payment header, no signature, no settlement — or parses a challenge you already hold. Returns x402_version, every accepts entry with scheme, network, resolved network name and chain id, asset, symbol, decimals and the amount both in raw units and in human form, plus the resource block and any expiry. amount_human is computed with the decimals of that token, resolved from a known-asset table or read from the chain; where decimals cannot be established it stays null and is listed in unavailable_fields rather than assuming six. parse_warnings names concrete gaps such as a missing description or missing inputSchema, a non-CAIP-2 network, a bridged instead of canonical asset, or an amount sent as a JSON number. It does not judge the service, does not pay, does not verify signatures and does not check whether the seller delivers. Answers for a URL are cached for 60 seconds; age_ms states the age of the fetched chall

Validates a 402 challenge — fetched from a URL without paying, or supplied directly — against PaymentRequiredV1Schema and PaymentRequiredV2Schema of the installed @x402/core reference implementation. Reports the detected version and how it was detected, every error with field, expected, found and spec_ref naming package, version, schema and field path, whether the network is valid CAIP-2, whether the asset is a known and canonical token address or a bridged variant, whether the declared inputSchema compiles as a JSON Schema, which protocol extensions are declared and which of them are known, and whether v1-only and v2-only clients could each act on this offer. price_sane flags amounts whose magnitude typically comes from a wrong decimal place; its thresholds are stated in the answer and it is reported as null wherever the asset is not a known stablecoin, since without a price feed that question cannot be answered honestly. This endpoint judges conformance only. It does not rate the ser

A stateless rule check for agents that pay for x402 endpoints. You supply the proposed payment, your policy and the amounts already spent this hour and this day; this endpoint keeps no ledger of its own and returns your counters unchanged. Every configured rule — max_per_call, max_per_hour, max_per_day, allowed_chains, allowed_assets, allowed_recipients, blocked_recipients, require_schema — is reported individually as erfuellt, verletzt, nicht_pruefbar or nicht_gesetzt, together with the limit and the actual value, so a rejection can be acted on. Amounts are compared exactly in the smallest unit of the token, using decimals resolved from a known-asset table or read from the chain; where decimals cannot be established the amount rules are reported as nicht_pruefbar and the decision becomes pruefen rather than a guess. risk_flags mark an unverifiable recipient, a missing input schema, a bridged instead of canonical token, an unusual or test chain and an amount above a fixed, stated thres

Cryptographic verification of the offer-receipt extension of x402. Accepts a signed offer in eip712, jws or eip191 form — either bundled as {format, payload, signature} or as payload plus a separate signature — and an optional signed receipt. Recovers the signer, compares it with the payTo of the offer, compares receipt and offer field by field and names every divergence with the value on each side, checks whether the offer has expired and whether the receipt timestamps are plausible against stated tolerances. The answer states plainly that recovering a signer proves nothing on its own: every well-formed ECDSA signature yields some address, so signer_matches_pay_to is the deciding field, and a valid signature from the wrong address is worthless. For jws the signer is a key identifier and not an EVM address, so signer_matches_pay_to is reported as null rather than guessed. If the verification method cannot be determined or a jws public key is missing, the call ends unverifiable with cha

Reads all incoming ERC-20 transfers of one token to one address within a block or time window and matches them against the receipts you supply. Matching runs first over the transaction hash, which is the strongest link, and otherwise over amount plus payer plus a stated time tolerance; the method used is named for every single match, so a weak match is never mistaken for a strong one. The answer lists matched pairs, receipts without a payment, payments without a receipt, amount mismatches with expected, found and difference, and duplicate receipts sharing a transaction hash or payment identifier. Totals are given for both sides with their difference, plus coverage_pct and the window actually used, including the block range and how timestamps were resolved to blocks. Unmatched items are never quietly dropped — they are the point of the exercise. Block timestamps are read from the chain for up to sixty distinct blocks; beyond that the timestamp of a payment stays null and says so. The wi

Reads the receipt of a transaction on Ethereum, Base, Base Sepolia, OP Mainnet, Arbitrum One, Polygon PoS or Avalanche C-Chain and compares it with what you expected to be paid. The comparison runs against the ERC-20 transfer events in the receipt, not against the transaction recipient, because in a token payment the transaction recipient is the token contract and never the seller. Returns every transfer event with sender, recipient, token, raw amount and human amount computed with that token decimals, the sum actually received by the expected recipient, underpaid_by and overpaid_by separately, the block number, the confirmation count, and a finality block read from the chain rather than estimated. Native coin payments are covered too when no token asset is expected. The verdict is bestaetigt, abweichung, nicht_gefunden or nicht_final; a correct but not yet finalized payment is reported as nicht_final rather than as confirmed. It does not pay, does not settle, does not sign and does no

Identify the technology stack of one website: CMS, shop, framework, JavaScript libraries with version, analytics, consent tool, payment provider, CDN, web server, host, font source, chat and booking widget.

Returns licensed ENTSO-E and SMARD spot-market context for compute, DePIN, battery and power-trading agents: published day-ahead prices, volatility, load, renewable share when available, the observed share of published negative-price hours, uncertainty, freshness and expiry.